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BOOK REVIEWS

IN THE ARENA
From Hitler’s Germany to Saddam’s Iraq: The Enduring False Promise of Preventive War, by Scott A.
Silverstone. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019. 323 pages. $30.

Professor Scott Silverstone is a PhD
political scientist and retired American
naval officer currently teaching international relations at the U.S. Military
Academy. The title of his latest book,
From Hitler’s Germany to Saddam’s
Iraq, is perhaps a misnomer, yet the
book remains an excellent read. It
concentrates, first, on the folly of France
in invading the Ruhr Valley in 1923 to
enforce its claim to 80 percent of the
coal mined there to pay the indemnity
owed to France pursuant to the Treaty
of Versailles, and, second, on Britain’s
wisdom in refusing to join France then
or in a proposed invasion to eject German troops from the Rhineland in 1936.
According to Silverstone, a preventive
war is a war that a more powerful state
launches against a hostile state that
is becoming more powerful, to keep
the latter from becoming powerful
enough to threaten the former. His
thesis is that a preventive war usually
does not improve the security of the
state that initiates it; in fact, such a
war often makes that state less secure.
To succeed, the aggressor would need
the power to annihilate the victim.
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The book explains this by considering
Thucydides’s security paradox—that
is, that one state increasing its military
strength to protect itself from a potential
enemy can impel the supposed enemy
to increase its own military strength,
thereby preventing the first state from
improving its security, costing each
state more resources, and possibly
leading to war through fear of the
enemy. However, Professor Silverstone’s
theory is more elaborate than this. He
sees the false promise of preventive war
arising when the less powerful state
has a severe grievance against the more
powerful one, but the more powerful
state will not cooperate in resolving this
grievance and instead launches a war to
prevent the weaker state from becoming powerful enough to initiate the
military action. However, operational
victory on the battlefield does not mean,
ipso facto, achievement of strategic
political success; in fact, victory can
strengthen the loser’s determination.
In the 1920s and ’30s, Germany
had considerable grievances against
the Allies, especially France, which
bore the blame for the Treaty of
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Versailles’s imposition of war guilt, a
loss of territory, heavy indemnities,
and disarmament. When France and
Belgium invaded the Ruhr Valley in
1923, they turned enmity into rage. They
caused such disorder and suffering that
they opened the way for radical movements and ensured that the German
public would support enthusiastically
Hitler’s reoccupation of the Rhineland
in 1936. In other words, the French
invasion intensified German grievances
and helped to produce World War II.
Meanwhile, Britain in 1923 refused to
join what Silverstone calls the Ruhr
War, and the United States withdrew its
token occupation force. In 1936, Britain
resisted French pleas to join a proposed
invasion, because this, at best, merely
would have delayed German rearmament. Instead, the United Kingdom
doubled its defense budget in three
years. The real failure was in alliances,
specifically (1) the alienation of Italy
over its invasion of Ethiopia, (2) Belgian
neutrality and the country’s failure to
build its sector of the Maginot Line, and
(3) the Soviet Union’s breaking of its
defense pact with France by concluding
the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Moreover,
Silverstone argues persuasively that an
invasion was unlikely to have overthrown, weakened, or deterred Hitler.
Finally, From Hitler’s Germany to Saddam’s Iraq is useful for its clarifications
of this period for an American audience.
One such clarification concerns the
severe consequences of the Ruhr War.
The Germans tried passive resistance
but escalated to sabotage as the French
occupation became more draconian.
Strikes, unemployment, riots, starvation,
and hyperinflation spread throughout
Germany. Another clarification is
that British politicians who became
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celebrities in the United States for
their opposition to appeasement (e.g.,
Winston Churchill) were not, in fact,
such proponents of forceful action as
they portrayed themselves to be in their
memoirs. Silverstone demonstrates this
through newspaper accounts, public
speeches, and formerly confidential
governmental memorandums. From
Hitler’s Germany to Saddam’s Iraq is
a useful warning against succumbing to the lure of preventive war.
KEVIN MCMULLEN

Last Mission to Tokyo: The Extraordinary Story
of the Doolittle Raiders and Their Final Fight for
Justice, by Michel Paradis. New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2020. 480 pages. $28.

The April 1942 air raid on Tokyo—led
by then–Lieutenant Colonel James H.
Doolittle, U.S. Army Air Corps—marked
a turning point in World War II. The
“Doolittle Raiders” successfully attacked
the Japanese homeland for the first
time, and thereby shifted strategic
calculations in both the United States
and Japan. Although their daring
mission pushed the technological limits
of the day, most of the eighty Doolittle
Raiders survived the raid, eventually
returning home as heroes; however,
eight airmen were captured by the
Japanese. Last Mission to Tokyo picks up
the story with their capture and shows
how their legacy remains relevant—even
with regard to modern-day military
commissions at Guantánamo.
Using a nonfiction but narrative style
of writing, Paradis provides a wellresearched and easy-to-read account
of the captured Doolittle Raiders’ grim
fate, culminating in the U.S. Army’s
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